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Much recent political thought assumes that moral philosophy is the prope r
starting point for political philosophy. This assumption underlies a trend which
may accelerate due to the influence of two recent books in political philosop hy,
John Rawls' A Theory of ]ustice 1 and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and
Utopia. 2 Nozick puts it succinctly, "Moral philosophy sets the background for,
and boundaries of, political philosophy," for what people may and may not do
to each other "limits what they may do through the apparatus of a state." 3 But
there are very real dangers for political philosophy if these books become firmly
established models for subsequent writing.
Both books suspend their theories in mid-air . They are essentially hypothetical constructions , not simply because of their use of social contract and state
of nature devices, but because they do not undertake the task that politica l
philosophers have traditionally accepted, the diagnosis of the crisis of the
political order. 4 Their theories are therefore solutions for problems that are not
investigated . Rawls simultaneously opposes moral relativism and the substantive commitment to utilitarianism . Yet, he never explains why utilitarianism is
of concern to anyone outside academic philosophy departments, and he does
not explore the causes of moral relativism, a task that would require an
explanation of the reasons for the lack of moral consensus in contemporary
political societies. Nozick constructs a theory of the minimal state withou t
showing why the individualist anarchism he opposes is a problem; he argues for
an entitlement theory of justice without discussing the political issues tha t
necessitate the theory. The positive state is his enemy, but he does not explain its
emergence, perhaps because of the damaging effect such an investigation
would have on his theory . For he would have been forced to confront matters he
prefers to ignore, the political problems that formed the context for the
emergence of the positive state .
Since Plato , western political philosophy has found that the diagnosis of the
crisis of the political order requires not just abstract moral argument , but an
analysis of political experience, the articulation of coherent theories of the self
1

Cambridge , Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.
New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974.
3 p. 6.
•Fora summary of the diagnostic function of political philosophy, see Thomas A. Spragens,
Understanding Political Theory. New York: St. Martin 's Press, 1976, chs. 2-3.
2
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and politics . A political philosophy that does not explore either human nature or
politics , that widest arena of human association , is ultimately sterile . Both Rawls
and Nozick reject the traditional role of the political theorist , which is, according to Spragens , " to understand politics by looking at it against the background
of human nature and other features of our world which we must take as
'givens'. " 5 Because Rawls and Nozick fail to relate moral principles to human
experience , they have little to say about the ways men behave politically .
Because they neglect the self in society they offer little diagnosis of the problem
of political order , and they can give the political actor little guidance for its
reconstru ction . A work that does not accept these major tasks traditionally
undertaken by political theorists does not simply evade theory ; it is deeply
flawed. This will be established through an examination of Rawls and ozick.

Rawls ' A Theory of Justice is less consistent than Nozick's book, but it is
mu ch more profound and comprehensive , a genuinel y creative work that
deserves the continuing analysis it will receive . But whatever its many merits it
suffers from its attempt to develop principles of justice from a neutral stance
toward human nature .6 This supposed neutrality covers its acceptance of a
particular view of the self, the atomistic individualism of Lockean liberalism, a
view that is itself contradicted by the approach to human experience Rawls
develops in his discussion of the sense of justice , the internalization by people of
moral principles as they live in association .7 The unity of this important book is
thus broken at its core .
Rawls' purposes are well known. He seeks rationally defensibl e principles
of justice for the basic structure of society .8 He believes that a social order
requires a public conception of justice , principles that are widely accepted and
known to be accepted . These principles " assign rights and duties in the basic
institutions of society , and they define the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens of social co-operation . " 9 Rawls tries to circumvent moral
relativism in the choice of principles of justice by a methodological device that
would bring agreement on the principles . He claims to write within the social
contract tradition when he argues that we may project ourselves into an
"original position ," a hypothetical situation characterized by a " veil of ignorance ."IO Each individual within this artificial condition would know he has
some plan of life , but he would not know the details of that plan . Each would
know , however , that necessary to the attainment of his plan are certain
" primar y social goods ," which include "rights and liberties , opportunities and
powers , income and wealth . " 11 Each would have general knowledge about
man , society , and economics , but no one would have an y particular knowledge
5

Ibid ., p. 4.
~ See especially pp . 118-75.
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about his own societ y and his place in it. Nor would anyone know his own
personality , capacities , or desires. Circumstances of moderate scarcity are
presupposed , for it would otherwise either be impossible to agree on princip les
of justice or they would be unnecessary . Each individual would be mutua lly
disinterested in the sense that he would not concern himself for others . Eac h
would seek principles which if accepted as a public conception of justice would
most likely maximize his own holdings of the primary social goods. The two
principles that Rawls believes would be adopted are in serial order ; the fir st
takes priorit y over the second .
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for
all.
(2) Social and econom ic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both :
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... , and
(b ) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equalit y of opportunity. 12

In his argument that the two principles would be chosen by "free and
rational persons concerned to further their own interests" 13 Rawls assumes these
principles are founded on a neutral perspective toward human nature . He
believes that whatever else we may think about the self we can all acce pt
principles of justice that would be chosen in a condition that did not pre-sup pose
unselfish persons who cared. for each other. But this is not simply a minim al
view of human nature . It is rather a particular conception . As John Schar r has
shown , it is the individualism of classical liberal theory .14 Although Raw ls'
individual wishes to choose principles that he would prefer no matter what he
should later find his interests to be , he sees himself as a separate individual with
particular , though unknown , interests.
Later in the book Rawls outlines a different , contradictory theory of
human nature. He is led to this discussion by his argument that the two
principles of justice will be chosen in part because they are more "stable"; they
will engender their own support , since when followed they will confirm more
closely to moral psychology than alternative principles . The "strains of comm itment " to the two principles will thus be less than those to be encountere d if
other principles are adopted . These facts of moral psychology will be known to
8

pp . 3- 11.
p. 4.
IO pp . 11-12, 136-42.
II p. 92.
12 p. 302.
13 p. 11.
1
• • John Schaar , " Reflections on Rawls' Theory of Justice," Social Theory and Practice, III, No.
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persons in the original position and will support the choice of the two principles. 15 This view of moral growth that Rawls sketches resembles Kohlberg's
stages of moral development.
For Rawls the person develops in three stages . 16 In the first stage , the
morality of authority, the child responds to the love of his parents . He comes to
love them and wants to express those forms of action that correspond to the sort
of person they want him to be . In the second stage , the morality of association,
the person develops moral standards appropriate to his role in the associations to
which he belongs . He acquires skills necessary to see things from the points of
view of others. He comes to desire the friendship and trust of his associates,
because they both affirm his well-being and express personal qualities that he
wishes to develop in himself . In the third stage , the morality of principle, the
person realizes that those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of institutions
he accepts as just. He wishes to support those institutions as he sees that a
common allegiance to them provides a perspective from which people can
adjudicate their differences . He thus comes to accept moral principles that will
structure his wider relationships .
Rawls presents a very classical view in which a person becomes human
through participation in widening social groups . He comes to see himself as part
of larger social wholes - families , communities, political societies. He does not
define himself simply as a separate individual with a purely personal life plan;
he is rather bound to others through his sense of identity . Because the person
develops his moral capacity by engaging in a dialogue with others , his free and
social dimensions are coherently related.
This social and developmental view of man is in opposition to the assumptions about human nature that underlie the central methodological device of A
Theory of Justice - the original position . Each of these conflicting approaches
to the self leads to a different concept of both rationality and values. But because
he neglects the implications of his social-developmental view of the self, Rawls
locks himself into the type of rationality and values implied in the idea of the
self as a separate individual. The individual in the original position operates by a
calculating rationality. He searches for the most efficient means to given ends ,
the maximization of his control of the primary social goods in the society to be
built on the principles that are selected . This sort of rationality is derived from
and inconceivable without the view of the self as a separate individual.
Much comment on A Theory of justice has occurred within the framework of a calculating rationality. A pervasive focus for discussion of the book has
been the issue as to whether it would be most "rational" for the individual in the
original position to choose the two principles . 17 What is neglected in these
arguments is the recognition that this is only one possible approach to rationality. Rawls unfortunately does not explore the type of rationality implicit
15
16

p . 455 -56 .
Tbese stages are discussed in pp. 461-79.
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in his discussion of moral development. This perspective would , if developed,
reject a calculating rationality in favor of a comprehending rationality . Comprehending rationality would lead the person to understand himself as part of
wider relationships and associations . To the calculating rationality of the
individualist view the highest value is the freedom of the individual to pursue
whatever plan of life he chooses. From the viewpoint of comprehending
rationality, the person will seek to maintain and improve the relationships and
associations of which he is part, not because they take precedence over his own
good , but because his own good is inseparable from them. Because he will not
define himself as a distinct , separate individual , the person's pursuit of his
interests will not be an absolute value , limited only by acknowledgement of the
co-relative rights and interests of other individuals . If other groups and institutions are important , then individual interest cannot be absolute ; but if people
are understood as separate individuals , institutions cannot be more than contractual relationships entered to further the interests of their members.
Other writers have offered important criticisms of Rawls' concept of
persons in the original position . Robert Paul Wolff argues that it is logically
impossible to attribute to such persons the knowledge Rawls ascribes to them_Ls
Brian Barry shows that because Rawls denies substantive moral sentiments to
these hypothetical individuals the principles chosen would not necessarily be
principles of justice. t 9 John Schaar correctly observes that it will be impossible
for rational egoists who chose the two principles in ignorance of their own
interests to abide by the principles when the veil of ignorance is lifted
postcontractually .
We can easily imagine such persons adopting Rawls' principles in a
situation of complete uncertainty or ignorance about the future , but it is
hard to imagine them keeping those agreements once they begin to acquire
some knowledge .... The principles of justice are accepted precisely because they can be shown to be advantageous to everyone , and that showing
simply cannot be made in the postcontractual situation , where persons
know their real situation and can adopt strategies and principles appropriate to it. ... It will be instantly clear to any rational egoist that the two
principles are not advantageous to him in every concrete social situation.
Hence , on Rawls' own argument, which makes advantage sovereign, he
would not be bound by the two principles in cases where the y damaged his
interests .20
17 This type of discussion can be seen, for example , in some of the articles on Rawls in the
American Political Science Review , LXIX, No. 2 (June, 1975). See especially the following: John C.
Harsanyi , "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls'
Theor y, " pp . 594-606; James Fishkin , "Justice and Rationality : Some Objections to the Central
Argument in Rawls' Theor y," pp. 615-29; Douglas Rae, " Maximin Justice and an Alternative
Principle of General Advantage,' pp. 630-47; and Benjamin R. Barber, "Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement , and Politics in Rawls,'' pp. 663-74.
18 Understanding Rawls. Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 72, Pt. IV.
19 The Liberal Theory of justice . London : Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 15-18.
20
Schaar, op. cit ., p. 78.
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Another equally serious problem for A Theory of Justice flows from the
inconsistent approaches to human nature in the book. If human moral development is as Rawls describes it, the principles of justice could not be chosen from
the original position. If the original position were to be an acceptable methodological device, his discussion of the social process of moral development
must be rejected, and his major argument for the stability of the two principles
is undermined. It makes no sense to say that individuals who have projected
themselves into the hypothetical original position can have as part of their
general knowledge the facts of moral psychology that Rawls describes. For in
this social-developmental view of the self the person's self-understanding would
prevent the choice of principles of justice as a separate individual from an
imaginary situation. It is only from the viewpoint of a calculating rationality
that individuals could project themselves at any moment into a hypothetical
situation from which they would determine the principles of social organization
that would probably benefit them most. People who believe themselves fundamentally related to others could not make this leap . They would develop moral
principles only from a social process in which they come to care for other
persons and associations of which they are part. There is of course a sense in
which individuals who imaginatively enter the original position could recognize a social "condition," for the interaction of separate individuals in society
must be regulated. But if man is a social "being" he could not enter the original
position. It would be as if Aristotle had said that man is a social and political
animal and then developed principles of justice from individualist premises .

In Part I of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick argues against anarchists
that a state is justified. He utilizes the state of nature device to show how a state
could arise in an "invisible hand" fashion from the contractual arrangements
between individuals and "protective associations." A "dominant protective
association" would emerge without violating anyone's rights. It would perform
the functions of a state. In Part II ozick argues that only a "minimal" state can
be justified . His is the "night watchman" state that may not legitimately
intervene in social or economic affairs except to protect individuals from those
who would threaten their rights. All other state action would violate their
"entitlements."
Nozick's theory of "enti tlements " is the most important and provocative
part of Anarchy, State and Utopia. 21 He argues specifically against Rawls and
in general against all positions which hold that there is some acceptable
redistributive role for the state. Redistributive theories of justice are, he claims,
"patterned" or "end-state" theories because the y try to fit people's holdings to
some "natural dimension" like moral merit, needs, marginal product , or effort.
He states that his is an historical theory , one that evaluates the justice of a
distribution in terms of its origins. People have rights to things they produce,
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either themselves or through buying or contracting for the held resources used
in the production process . They are also entitled to things they receive through
voluntar y transfer , as in the case of contracts , gifts , and bequests . Nozick accepts
from Locke's analysis of property in the state of nature the proviso that one
cannot have a right to a previously unowned thing if the liberty of others to use
the thing is worsened . Then he strictly circumscribes the principle . It would not
be acceptable for one to buy up all the drinking water in the world ; yet , a
medical researcher might synthesize a drug to treat a disease but refuse to sell to
others except on his own terms , since others have access to all the materials
necessar y to produce the drug.
The consequence of the entitlement theory is that when a person is forced
to give up something to which he is entitled he is subjected to forced labor; he
becomes simply a means to another 's ends. Nozick even goes this far : "Taxation
of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. " 22 No benevolent achievement of social ends can be justified by taxation which forces some to give up part
of their holdings to others. Furthermore, a society which respects the entitlements of its members will be a contractual society . Each individual will buy and
sell, transferring his holdings to others for their holdings or cooperation . Thus
Nozick rallies us behind his slogan: "From each as they choose, to each as they
are chosen . " 23
Nozick actually offers no positive defense of his entitlement theory . His
arguments are negative ; the y attack distributive positions , particularly that of
Rawls. 24 For all its ingenuity , Nozick 's entitlement position is ultimately tautological - people are entitled to their entitlements . But the tautological
character of the argument is hidden in his assumptions about human nature. He
states that
there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its
own good . There are only individual people , different individual people ,
with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of
others , uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more .
These limitations on what we can do to each other
reflect the fact of our separate existences . They reflect the fact that no
moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good.
There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others .25
21

See especially pp . 150-82.
p. 169.
p. 160.
24 For a summar y and anal r,sisof Nozick's negative arguments see Thomas Scanlon, "Nozick on
Rights, Liberty , and Propert y, ' Philosophy and Public Affairs , VI, No. l (Fall , 1976),pp . 3-25.
25
pp . 32-33.
22
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Given this view of human nature , Nozick's model of human interaction quite
naturally becomes that of exchange relationships . People are " distinct individuals , each with his own life to lead"; they relate as they make deals to further
their mutual interests .
Only on such assumptions about the self could Nozick discuss the possible
origin of the state from contractual arrangements between individuals and
protective associations, for only in such a view could the individual be assumed
to have the calculating rationality necessary to the exchange process prior to the
development of political society .26 Nozick's position on human nature also leads
to the entitlement theory . It would of course be logical to say that people should
be able to keep what they have acquired; of course government or other
institutions should not interfere . If people are really separate, isolated individuals, then they should be free to calculate their interests , to compete with one
another , and to retain what they acquire. But from a social-developmental view
of the self, it would be possible to argue that other values, such as the needs of
other persons or the general welfare , might take precedence over the individual's right to retain everything he owns.
What is objectionable is not that Nozick has a position on human nature ,
but rather his assumption that this position is a fact , that it needs no defense . He
bases his whole book on undefended assumptions . We must remember that one
can proceed from undefended assumptions only if the argument is not entirely
dependent on the assumptions . If everything else follows from the assumptions
there is no real argument at all. Nozick posits a position on human nature that
Plato attacked in extended argument , but he fails to acknowledge any other
approaches that must be examined . Any theory that begs the question of what it
means to be human , yet draws important conclusions from its assumptions
about the self, is simply an abandonment of political philosophy .
Nozick's undefended assumptions about the self lead him into a theoretical
quagmire . He wants all relationships between individuals to be strictly voluntar y. He thinks that one individual does not have a legitimate say in the
decisions of another simply because those decisions may affect him. He uses
marriage as an example. An individual who wishes to marry another but is
rejected cannot claim the right to interfere in the other's choice of a mate .
Nozick errs in transferring to society as a whole such a voluntar y personal
relationship as marriage . He believes that any forced interdependence is
slavery. But only within his position that the self is a separate individual could
interdependence be strictly a matter of choice . From a social-developmental
approach to the self a person is in a web of interdependence all his life before the
state compels him to serve others ' needs. Since interdependence is forced on a
person by his nature , to say'that forced interdependence is oppressive would be
an admission that human nature is oppressive .
26
See Sheldon Wolin's review of Anarchy , State and Utopia in the New York Ttmes Book
Remew, May 11, 1975, p. 31.
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Nozick's belief that each individual retains free, unstructured choice if he
is not physically aggressed by others flows from his undefended assumptions
about the self, assumptions that prevent discussion of the preconditions of
human fulfillment. His utopia is a vision of society in which each person can do
what he wants. It will be provided by a minimal state that "allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and
our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. " 27 But this utopia is
only for the wealthy. Nozick's book can be justly condemned for the lack of
seriousness that motivates Rawls' work, for Rawls realizes that "primary social
goods" are necessary to the achievement by an individual of his life plan.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia ultimately degenerates to ideology. Nozick
assumes the structure of holdings in market societies is just, that it derives from
original acquisitions of the unowned fruits of nature plus voluntary transfers.
He accepts the fairness of the outcome of market transactions without attempting to show that those who control major economic institutions justly acquired
their holdings. He does not acknowledge the power element in economic
transfers , in the selling of labor, in the buying of products, in the determination
of what is to be produced. Although he claims to defend an historical entitlement theory, there is, as Sheldon Wolin points out, "no reference to any
historical circumstance," and there is "no reference to any actual political
event, action, or society. " 28

The failure to develop a coherent theory of human nature is closely related
to the apolitical character of both books . Given Nozick's wholehearted acceptance of the view of man as a separate individual and his relegation of political
institutions to the protection of individual entitlements, there is little need to
discuss politics . Further intervention by the state is unnecessary. ozick is very
much the classical liberal, but he gives no fundamental defense of his position.
He relegates political life to the realm of force; government is the agency of
coercion, society the arena of spontaneous action. As there need be only a
minimal role for political action, so there is also a minimal role for political
philosophy . "Political philosophy is concerned only with certain ways that
persons may not use others; primarily physically aggressing against them. " 29
Political philosophy can thus have nothing meaningful to say about that total
relationships within which men become moral beings.
Rawls also gives little attention to politics. Part Two of A Theory of Justice
outlines the constitutional and legislative stages, when rules for particular
political societies are adopted after the veil of ignorance is partially lifted. But
27

p . 334 .

28
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this section is limited to discussion of an abstract set of political functions that
must be arranged in accord with the two principles . Rawls makes a distinction
between ideal theory and non-ideal theory and claims to be primarily engaged
in the construction of an ideal theory . He states that only after ideal principles
are derived can one have a standard by which to judge actual political situations
in which these principles may be only partially implemented. 30 Yet, he never
deals with the many problems that stand in the way of the implementation of
the two principles . There is no discussion , for example , of alienation, bureaucrac y, or powerlessness. We are left only with the two principles as general
guidelines for the constitutional and legislative stages . or is it simply the
implementation of his ideal principles that is at stake . Although we do not
demand that the political philosopher give detailed outlines of specific institutional procedures or policy decisions, we do expect general exploration of the
causes of social disorder and an argument that his prescription will meet the
crisis he explains . Rawls is of course concerned about the need to protect basic
liberties and to mitigate inequality , for the two principles are addressed to these
matters , but we are left to speculate about the nature of the threats to liberty and
equalit y in industrialized societies.
It is the methodological approach used in the construction of his ideal
theor y that leads Rawls from a discussion of political crisis. He imagines an
objective position from which people might agree on principles of justice , but
the original position and the veil of ignorance preclude knowledge of specific
circumstances of individuals and problems of society. If Rawls had abandoned
the original position and attempted to derive the two principles from his
discussion of the process of moral development , it would have been necessary
for him to show how social and political life poses problems to which the two
principles provide solutions. He would have discussed the crises of social order
that prevent persons from coming to see the truth of the two principles. He
would have shown how the process of moral development could lead people to
see that the two principles would bring order . For example , he might have
argued that the egalitarian aspects of the difference principle would be derived
when the person's locus of caring is extended to the whole community. And he
might have shown that the basic freedoms of the first principle would be
supported by people as they learned to care for others.
Rawls and Nozick probably ignore serious political problems in part
because such a discussion would call into question either their assumptions
about human nature or the possibility of achieving social order given these
assumptions . Both neglect crucial political difficulties when they base their
theories on a fundamental harmony of interests in society . They presuppose no
incompatible interests ; society, it is assumed , can accommodate all legitimate
demands. Rawls builds a basic harmony of interests into his theory when he
states that th e original position will presume conditions of "mod erate scarcity ,"
30

pp. 245-46.
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scarcity so that principles of justice to apportion the benefits of social cooperation will be necessary , moderate scarcity so that agreement on principles by
which to live will be possible. But every society will at some point face serious
problems such as war , racism , or economic crisis. A community that confronts
extraordinary hardship or threat cannot meet its difficulties if its citizens
behave as separate individuals in pursuit of their own interests . When society is
no longer affluent and secure the widespread assumption that people are
separate , isolated individuals will only lead to cynical, alienated citizens,
dispirited because their interests cannot be satisfied. If political philosophy
makes such assumptions about human nature it cannot address the crises that
societies will face when economic expansion and class or sectional harmony can
no longer be taken for granted .
The highest value to both Rawls and Nozick is the individual's freedom to
choose and pursue his own private life plan. Nozick is consistent in basing this
value on individualistic assumptions about man. Rawls' two approaches to
human nature do not consistently support this value . His discussion of the social
process of moral development implies that the individual's pursuit of his own
life plan is subordinate to the needs of others , but Rawls does not push his
remarks to these lengths . The core of his book, the derivation of the two
principles of justice , proceeds in an opposite direction . Because individual selfinterest is the foundation for choice of the two principles , the duty of individuals
is to the two principles and to institutions which embody and uphold them. For
Rawls, like ozick, positive obligation to others is merely a byproduct of the
rational calculation of self-interest. But enlightened self-interest is still selfinterest. As ozick clearly acknowledges , Lockean individualism leads to a "noharm " morality. What individuals owe one another is mutual respect for the
pursuit of their divergent private interests .
A morality larger than the "no-harm" principle is impossible unless the self
is defined as part of a larger whole . Caring is more than tolerating ; it transcends
the maxim , "Thou shalt not interfere. " If the person is viewed as a social being
who develops in a web of interdependence, he will have an obligation to meet
the real needs of others , or in cases of conflict to balance them against his own.
The orientation to the self thus structures the concept of duty that is permissible
in a moral theory . A moral theory that is built on unexplored or inconsistent
assumptions about human nature is questionable moral philosophy .
In summary, a moral theory that does not carefully examine human nature
and politics is not an adequate basis for political philosophy . Nozick sees that his
theory rests on his assumptions about human nature , but he is not aware that his
book cannot be taken seriously if these assumptions are left undefended . Rawls'
work contains two contradictory, mutually destructive approaches to human
nature . Moreover , both writers basicall y ignore politics . Thus neither Rawls nor
Nozick can offer a diagnosis of the problems of the political order . They
therefore do not present an acceptable model for contemporary political
philosophy .

